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The relationship between Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) functional structures (f-
structures) for sentences and their semantic interpretations can be expressed directly in a
fragment of linear logic in a way that correctly explains the constrained interactions between
quantifier scope ambiguity, bound anaphora and intensionality.
The use of a deductive framework to account for the compositional properties of quanti-
fying expressions in natural language obviates the need for additional mechanisms, such as
Cooper storage, to represent the different scopes that a quantifier might take. Instead, the
semantic contribution of a quantifier is recorded as a logical formula whose use in a proof
will establish the scope of the quantifier. Different proofs will in general lead to different
scopes. In each complete proof, the properties of linear logic will ensure that each quantifier
is properly scoped.
The interactions between quantified NPs and intensional verbs such as ‘seek’ are also
accounted for in this deductive setting. A single specification in linear logic of the argument
requirements of intensional verbs is sufficient to derive the correct reading predictions for
intensional-verb clauses both with nonquantified and with quantified direct objects. In
particular, both de dicto and de re readings are derived for quantified objects. The effects
of type-raising or quantifying-in rules in other frameworks here just follow as linear-logic
theorems.
While our approach resembles current categorial approaches in important ways (Moort-
gat, 1988; Moortgat, 1992a; Morrill, 1993; Carpenter, 1993), it differs from them in allowing
the greater type flexibility of categorial semantics (van Benthem, 1991) while maintaining a
precise connection to syntax. As a result, we are able to provide derivations for certain read-
ings of sentences with intensional verbs and complex direct objects that are not derivable
in current purely categorial accounts of the syntax-semantics interface.
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1 Introduction
This paper describes a part of our ongoing investigation in the use of formal deduction
to explicate the relationship between syntactic analyses in Lexical-Functional Grammar
(LFG) and semantic interpretations. We use linear logic (Girard, 1987) to represent the
connection between two dissimilar linguistic levels: LFG f-structures and their semantic
interpretations.
F-structures provide a uniform representation of syntactic information relevant to se-
mantic interpretation that abstracts away from the varying details of phrase structure and
linear order in particular languages. As Halvorsen (1988) notes, however, the flatter, un-
ordered functional structure of LFG does not fit well with traditional semantic composi-
tionality, based on functional abstraction and application, which mandates a rigid order of
semantic composition. We are thus led to a more relaxed form of compositionality, in which,
as in more traditional ones, the semantics of each lexical entry in a sentence is used exactly
once in interpretation, but without imposing a rigid order of composition. Approaches to
semantic interpretation that encode semantic representations in attribute-value structures
(Pollard and Sag, 1987; Fenstad et al., 1987; Pollard and Sag, 1993) offer such a relaxation
of compositionality, but are unable to properly represent constraints on variable binding
and scope (Pereira, 1990).
The present approach, in which linear logic is used to specify the relation between f-
structures and their meanings, provides exactly what is required for a calculus of semantic
composition for LFG. It can directly represent the constraints on the creation and use of
semantic units in sentence interpretation, including those pertaining to variable binding and
scope, without forcing a particular hierarchical order of composition, except as required by
the properties of particular lexical entries.
The use of formal deduction in semantic interpretation was implicit in deductive systems
for categorial syntax (Lambek, 1958), and has been made explicit through applications of
the Curry-Howard parallelism between proofs and terms in more recent work on categorial
semantics (van Benthem, 1988; van Benthem, 1991), labeled deductive systems (Moortgat,
1992b) and flexible categorial systems (Hendriks, 1993). Accounts of the syntax-semantics
interface in the categorial tradition require that syntactic and semantic analyses be formal-
ized in parallel algebraic structures of similar signatures, based on generalized application
and abstraction (or residuation) operators and structure-preserving relations between them.
Those accounts therefore force the adoption of categorial syntactic analyses, with an unde-
sirably strong dependence on phrase structure and linear order.
We have previously shown that the linear-logic formalization of the syntax-semantics
interface for LFG provides simple and general analyses of modification, functional complete-
ness and coherence, and complex predicate formation (Dalrymple, Lamping, and Saraswat,
1993; Dalrymple et al., 1993). In the present paper, the analysis is extended to the inter-
pretation of quantified NPs. After an overview of the approach, we present our analysis
of the compositional properties of quantified NPs, and we show that the analysis correctly
accounts for scope ambiguity and its interactions with bound anaphora. We also present an
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analysis of intensional verbs, which take quantified arguments, and show that our approach
predicts the full range of acceptable readings without appealing to additional machinery.
2 LFG and Linear Logic
Syntactic framework LFG assumes two syntactic levels of representation. Constituent
structure (c-structure) encodes phrasal dominance and precedence relations, and is rep-
resented as a phrase structure tree. Functional structure (f-structure) encodes syntac-
tic predicate-argument structure, and is represented as an attribute-value matrix. The
c-structure and f-structure for sentence (1) are given in (2):
(1) Bill appointed Hillary.
(2) C-structure: F-structure:
S
NP VP
V NP
Bill appointed Hillary


pred ‘appoint’
subj
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj
[
pred ‘Hillary’
]


As illustrated, an f-structure consists of a collection of attributes, such as pred, subj, and
obj, whose values can, in turn, be other f-structures.
The relationship between c-structure trees and the corresponding f-structures is given
by a functional projection function φ from c-structure nodes to f-structures. More generally,
LFG analyses involve several levels of linguistic representation called projections related by
means of projection functions (Kaplan, 1987; Halvorsen and Kaplan, 1988). For instance,
phonological, morphological, or discourse structure might be represented by a phonological,
morphological, or discourse projection, related to other projections by means of functional
specifications.
The functional projection of a c-structure node is the solution of constraints associ-
ated with the phrase-structure rules and lexical entries used to derive the node. In each
rule or lexical entry constraint, the ↑ metavariable refers to the φ-image of the mother c-
structure node, and the ↓ metavariable refers to the φ-image of the nonterminal labeled by
the constraint (Kaplan and Bresnan, 1982, page 183). For example, the following annotated
phrase-structure rules were used in the analysis of sentence (1):
(3) S −→ NP
(↑ subj) = ↓
VP
↑= ↓
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The annotations on the rule indicate that the f-structure for the S (↑ in the annotation on
the NP node) has a subj attribute whose value is the f-structure for the NP daughter (↓ in
the annotation on the NP node), and that the S node corresponds to an f-structure which
is the same as the f-structure for the VP daughter.
When the phrase-structure rule for S is used in the analysis of a particular sentence, the
metavariables ↑ and ↓ are instantiated to particular f-structures placed in correspondence
with nodes of the c-structure. We will refer to actual f-structures by giving them names
such as f , g, and h. The instantiated phrase structure rule is given in (4), with the φ
correspondence between c-structure nodes and f-structures indicated by the directed arcs
from phrase-structure nodes to attribute-value matrices:
(4) S −→ NP
(f subj) = h
VP
f = g
S
NP VP
f, g :
[
subj h :[]
]
Lexical entries also use the metavariables ↑ and ↓ to encode information about the f-
structures of the preterminal nodes that immediately dominate them. A partial lexical
entry for the word ‘Bill’ is:
(5) Bill NP (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
This entry states that ‘Bill’ has syntactic category NP. The constraint (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
states that the preterminal node immediately dominating the terminal symbol ‘Bill’ has
an f-structure whose value for the attribute pred is ‘Bill’. In this paper, we will provide
only the most minimal f-structural representations, leaving aside all details of syntactic
specification; in this example, for instance, agreement and other syntactic features of ‘Bill’
have been omitted.
For a particular instance of use of the word ‘Bill’, the following c-structure and f-
structure configuration results:
(6) (h pred) = ‘Bill’
NP
Bill
h :
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
Other lexical entries similarly specify features of the f-structure of the immediately dom-
inating preterminal node. The following is a list of the phrase structure rules and lexical
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entries used in the analysis of example (1):1
(7) S −→ NP
(↑ subj) = ↓
VP
↑= ↓
VP −→ V
↑= ↓
NP
(↑ obj) = ↓
(8) Bill NP (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
appointed V (↑ pred)= ‘appoint’
Hillary NP (↑ pred) = ‘Hillary’
For a more complete explication of the syntactic assumptions of LFG, see Bresnan (1982),
Levin, Rappaport, and Zaenen (1983), and the references cited there.
Lexically-specified semantics A distinguishing feature of our work (and of other work
within the LFG framework) is that semantic composition does not take syntactic domi-
nance and precedence relations as the main input. Instead, we follow other work in LFG
(Kaplan and Bresnan 1982, Halvorsen 1983, Halvorsen and Kaplan 1988, and many others)
in assuming that the functional syntactic information encoded by f-structures determines
semantic composition. That is, we believe that meaning composition is mainly determined
by syntactic relations such as subject-of , object-of , modifier-of , and so on. Those relations
are realized by different c-structure forms in different languages, but are represented directly
and uniformly in the f-structure.
In LFG, syntactic predicate-argument structure is projected from lexical entries. There-
fore, its effect on semantic composition will for the most part – in fact, in all the cases
considered in this paper – be determined by lexical entries, not by phrase-structure rules.
In particular, the two phrase-structure rules given above for S and VP need not encode se-
mantic information, but only specify how grammatical functions such as subj are expressed
in English. In some cases, the constituent structure of a syntactic construction may make
a direct semantic contribution, as when properties of the construction as a whole and not
just of its lexical elements are responsible for the interpretation of the construction. Such
cases include, for instance, relative clauses with no complementizer (‘the man Bill met’).
We will not discuss construction-specific interpretation rules in this paper.
In the same way as the functional projection function φ associates f-structures to c-
structures as described above, we will use a semantic or σ-projection function σ to map
f-structures to semantic or σ-structures encoding information about f-structure meaning.
1Those familiar with other analyses within the LFG framework will notice that we have not included a
list of grammatical functions subcategorized for by the verb ‘appoint’; this is because we assume a different
treatment of the LFG requirements of completeness and coherence. We return to this point below.
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For instance, the following lexical entry for ‘Bill’ extends (8) with a suitable constraint on
semantic structure:
(9) Bill NP (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
↑σ❀Bill
The additional constraint
↑σ❀Bill
is what we call the meaning constructor of the entry. The expression ↑σ stands for the
σ projection of the f-structure ↑. The σ projection is an attribute-value matrix like the
f-structure. For simple entries such as this, the σ projection has no internal structure;
below, we will examine cases in which the σ projection is structured with several different
attributes.
As above, for a particular use of ‘Bill’, the metavariable ↑ will be replaced by a particular
f-structure h, with semantic projection hσ:
(10) (h pred) = ‘Bill’
NP
Bill
h :
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
hσ :[ ]❀Bill
More generally, the association between the semantic structure hσ and a meaning P is
represented by the atomic formula hσ❀P , where ❀ is an otherwise uninterpreted binary
predicate symbol. (In fact, we use not one but a family of relations ❀τ indexed by the
semantic type of the intended second argument, although for simplicity we will omit the
type subscript whenever it is determinable from context.) We can now explain the meaning
constructor in (9). If a particular occurrence of ‘Bill’ in a sentence is associated with
f-structure h, the syntactic constraint in the lexical entry Bill will be instantiated as:
(h pred) = ‘Bill’
and the semantic constraint will be instantiated as:
hσ❀Bill
representing the association between hσ and the constant Bill representing its meaning.
We will often informally say that P is h’s meaning without referring to the role of the
semantic structure hσ in hσ❀P . We will see, however, that f-structures and their semantic
projections must be distinguished, because semantic projections can carry more information
than just the association to the meaning for the corresponding f-structure.
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Logical representation of semantic compositionality We now turn to an exami-
nation of the lexical entry for ‘appointed’. In this case, the meaning constructor is more
complex, as it relates the meanings of the subject and object of a clause to the clause’s
meaning:
(11) appointed V (↑ pred)= ‘appoint’
∀X,Y. (↑ subj)
σ
❀X ⊗ (↑ obj)
σ
❀Y −◦ ↑σ❀appoint (X,Y )
The meaning constructor is the linear-logic formula:
∀X,Y. (↑ subj)
σ
❀X ⊗ (↑ obj)
σ
❀Y −◦ ↑σ❀appoint (X,Y )
in which the linear-logic connectives of multiplicative conjunction ⊗ and linear implication
−◦ are used to specify how the meaning of a clause headed by the verb is composed from
the meanings of the arguments of the verb. For the moment, we can think of the linear
connectives as playing the same role as the analogous classical connectives conjunction ∧
and implication →, but we will soon see that the specific properties of the linear connectives
are essential to guarantee that lexical entries bring into the interpretation process all and
only the information provided by the corresponding words.
The meaning constructor for ‘appointed’ asserts, then, that if the subject (subj) of a
clause with main verb ‘appointed’ means X and its object (obj) means Y , then the whole
clause means appoint (X,Y ).2 The meaning constructor can thus be thought of as a linear
definite clause, with the variables X and Y playing the same role as Prolog variables.
A particular instance of use of ‘appointed’ produces the following f-structure and mean-
ing constructor:
(12) (f pred) = ‘appoint’
V
appointed
f :


pred ‘appoint’
subj [ ]
obj [ ]

 fσ :[ ]
∀X,Y. (f subj)
σ
❀X ⊗ (f obj)
σ
❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint(X,Y )
2In fact, we believe that the correct treatment of the relation between a verb and its arguments requires
the use of mapping principles specifying the relation between the array of semantic arguments required by
a verb and their possible syntactic realizations (Bresnan and Kanerva, 1989; Alsina, 1993; Butt, 1993). A
verb like ‘appoint’, for example, might specify that one of its arguments is an agent and the other is a theme.
Mapping principles would then specify that agents can be realized as subjects and themes as objects.
Here we make the simplifying assumption (valid for English) that the arguments of verbs have already
been linked to syntactic functions and that this linking is represented in the lexicon. In the case of complex
predicates this assumption produces incorrect results, as shown by Butt (1993) for Urdu. Mapping principles
are very naturally incorporated into the framework discussed here; see Dalrymple, Lamping, and Saraswat
(1993) and Dalrymple et al. (1993) for discussion and illustration.
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The instantiated meaning constructor asserts that f is the f-structure for a clause with
predicate (pred) ‘appoint’, and:
• if f ’s subject (f subj) has meaning X
• and (⊗) f ’s object (f obj) has meaning Y
• then ( −◦ ) f has meaning appoint (X,Y ).
It is not an accident that the form of the meaning constructor for appointed is analogous
to the type (e × e) → t which, in its curried form e→ e→ t, is the standard type for
a transitive verb in a compositional semantics setting (Gamut, 1991). In general, the
propositional structure of the meaning constructors of lexical entries will parallel the types
assigned to the meanings of the same words in compositional analyses.
As mentioned above, in most cases phrase-structure rules make no semantic contribu-
tions of their own. Thus, all the semantic information for a sentence like ‘Bill appointed
Hillary’ is provided by the lexical entries for ‘Bill’, ‘appointed’, and ‘Hillary’:
(13) Bill NP (↑ pred) = ‘Bill’
↑σ❀Bill
appointed V (↑ pred)= ‘appoint’
∀X,Y. (↑ subj)
σ
❀X ⊗ (↑ obj)
σ
❀Y −◦ ↑σ❀appoint (X,Y )
Hillary NP (↑ pred) = ‘Hillary’
↑σ❀Hillary
Assembly of meanings via deduction We have now the ingredients for building se-
mantic interpretations by deductive means. To recapitulate the development so far, lexical
entries provide semantic constructors, which are linear-logic formulas specifying how the
meanings of f-structures are built from the meanings of their substructures. Thus, linear
logic serves as a glue language to assemble meanings. Certain terms in the glue language
represent (open) formulas of an appropriate meaning language, which for the present pur-
poses will be a version of Montague’s intensional logic (Montague, 1974).3 Other terms in
the glue language represent semantic projections. The glue-language formula f❀t, with f
a term representing a semantic projection and t a term representing a meaning-language
formula, expresses the association between the semantic projection denoted by f and the
meaning fragment denoted by t.
The fragment of linear logic we use as glue language will be described incrementally
as we discuss examples, and is summarized in Appendix A. The semantic contribution of
each lexical entry is a linear-logic formula, its meaning constructor, that can be understood
3The reader familiar with Montague may be surprised by the apparently purely extensional form of the
meaning terms in the examples that follow, in contrast with Montague’s use of intensional expressions even in
purely extensional cases to allow for uniform translation rules. The reasons for this divergence are explained
in Section 4.
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as “instructions” for combining the meanings of the lexical entry’s syntactic arguments to
obtain the meaning of the f-structure headed by the entry. In the case of the verb ‘appointed’
above, the meaning constructor is a glue language formula consisting of instructions on how
to assemble the meaning of a sentence with main verb ‘appointed’, given the meanings of
its subject and object.
We will now show how meanings are assembled by linear-logic deduction. The full set of
proof rules relevant to this paper is given in Appendix B. For readability, however, we will
present derivations informally in the main body of the paper. As a first example, consider
the lexical entries in (13) and let the constants f , g and h name the following f-structures:
(14)
f :


pred ‘appoint’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
pred ‘Hillary’
]


Instantiating the lexical entries for ‘Bill’, ‘Hillary’, and ‘appointed’ appropriately, we obtain
the following meaning constructors, abbreviated as bill, hillary, and appointed:
bill: gσ❀Bill
hillary: hσ❀Hillary
appointed: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y )
These formulas show how the generic semantic contributions in the lexical entries are in-
stantiated to reflect their participation in this particular f-structure. Since the entry ‘Bill’
gives rise to f-structure g, the meaning constructor for ‘Bill’ provides a meaning for gσ.
Similarly, the meaning constructor for ‘Hillary’ provides a meaning for hσ . The verb ‘ap-
pointed’ requires two pieces of information, the meanings of its subject and object, in no
particular order, to produce a meaning for the clause. As instantiated, the f-structures
corresponding to the subject and object of the verb are g and h, respectively, and f is the
f-structure for the entire clause. Thus, the instantiated entry for ‘appointed’ shows how to
combine a meaning for gσ (its subject) and hσ (its object) to generate a meaning for fσ
(the entire clause).
In the following, assume that the formula bill-appointed is defined thus:
bill-appointed: ∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (Bill , Y )
Then the following derivation is possible in linear logic (⊢ stands for the linear-logic entail-
ment relation):
(15) bill⊗ hillary⊗ appointed (Premises.)
⊢ bill-appointed⊗ hillary X 7→ Bill
⊢ fσ❀appoint (Bill ,Hillary) Y 7→ Hillary
Each formula is annotated with the variable substitutions (universal instantiations) required
to derive it from the preceding one by the modus ponens rule A⊗ (A −◦ B) ⊢ B.
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Of course, another derivation is also possible. Assume that the formula appointed-hillary
is defined as:
appointed-hillary: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Hillary)
Then we have the following derivation:
(16) bill⊗ hillary⊗ appointed (Premises.)
⊢ bill⊗ appointed-hillary Y 7→ Hillary
⊢ fσ❀appoint (Bill ,Hillary) X 7→ Bill
In summary, each word in a sentence contributes a linear-logic formula, its meaning
constructor, relating the semantic projections of specific f-structures in the LFG analysis to
representations of their meanings. From these glue language formulas, the interpretation
process attempts to deduce an atomic formula relating the semantic projection of the whole
sentence to a representation of the sentence’s meaning. Alternative derivations may yield
different such conclusions, corresponding to ambiguities of semantic interpretation.
Linear logic As we have just outlined, we use deduction in linear logic to assign mean-
ings to sentences, starting from information about their functional structure and about the
semantic contributions of their words. Traditional compositional approaches depend on a
strict separation between functors and arguments, typically derived from a binary-branching
phrase-structure tree. In contrast, our linear-logic-based approach allows the premises car-
rying semantic information to commute while keeping their connection to the f-structure,
and is thus more compatible with the flat and relatively free form organization of functional
structure.
An important motivation for using linear logic is that it allows us to directly capture
the intuition that lexical items and phrases each contribute exactly once to the meaning of
a sentence. As noted by Klein and Sag (1985, page 172):
Translation rules in Montague semantics have the property that the translation
of each component of a complex expression occurs exactly once in the trans-
lation of the whole. . . .That is to say, we do not want the set S [of semantic
representations of a phrase] to contain all meaningful expressions of IL which
can be built up from the elements of S, but only those which use each element
exactly once.
In our terms, the semantic contributions of the constituents of a sentence are not context-
independent assertions that may be used or not in the derivation of the meaning of the
sentence depending on the course of the derivation. Instead, the semantic contributions
are occurrences of information which are generated and used exactly once. For example,
the formula gσ❀Bill can be thought of as providing one occurrence of the meaning Bill
associated to the semantic projection gσ. That meaning must be consumed exactly once
(for example, by appointed in (15)) in the derivation of a meaning of the entire utterance.
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It is this “resource-sensitivity” of natural language semantics—an expression is used
exactly once in a semantic derivation—that linear logic can model. The basic insight un-
derlying linear logic is that logical formulas are resources that are produced and consumed
in the deduction process. This gives rise to a resource-sensitive notion of implication, the
linear implication −◦ : the formula A −◦ B can be thought of as an action that can consume
(one copy of) A to produce (one copy of) B. Thus, the formula A⊗(A −◦ B) linearly entails
B. It does not entail A ⊗ B (because the deduction consumes A), and it does not entail
(A −◦ B)⊗B (because the linear implication is also consumed in doing the deduction). This
resource-sensitivity not only disallows arbitrary duplication of formulas, but also disallows
arbitrary deletion of formulas. Thus the linear multiplicative conjunction ⊗ is sensitive to
the multiplicity of formulas: A⊗A is not equivalent to A (the former has two copies of the
formula A). For example, the formula A ⊗ A ⊗ (A −◦ B) linearly entails A ⊗ B (there is
still one A left over) but does not entail B (there must still be one A present). In this way,
linear logic checks that a formula is used once and only once in a deduction, enforcing the
requirement that each component of an utterance contributes exactly once to the assembly
of the utterance’s meaning.
A direct consequence of the above properties of linear logic is that the constraints
of functional completeness and coherence hold without further stipulation4 (Dalrymple,
Lamping, and Saraswat, 1993). In the present setting, the feature structure f corresponding
to the utterance is associated with the (⊗) conjunction φ of all the formulas associated with
the lexical items in the utterance. The conjunction is said to be complete and coherent iff
Th ⊢ φ −◦ fσ❀t (for some term t), where Th is the background theory of general linguistic
principles. Each t is to be thought of as a valid meaning for the sentence. This guarantees
that the entries are used exactly once in building up the denotation of the utterance: no
syntactic or semantic requirements may be left unfulfilled, and no meaning may remain
unused.
Our glue language needs to be only a fragment of higher-order linear logic, the ten-
sor fragment, that is closed under conjunction, universal quantification, and implication.
This fragment arises from transferring to linear logic the ideas underlying the concurrent
constraint programming scheme of Saraswat (1989).5
4‘An f-structure is locally complete if and only if it contains all the governable grammatical functions
that its predicate governs. An f-structure is complete if and only if all its subsidiary f-structures are locally
complete. An f-structure is locally coherent if and only if all the governable grammatical functions that
it contains are governed by a local predicate. An f-structure is coherent if and only if all its subsidiary
f-structures are locally coherent.’ (Kaplan and Bresnan, 1982, pages 211–212)
To illustrate:
(a) *John devoured. [incomplete]
(b) *John arrived Bill the sink. [incoherent]
5Saraswat and Lincoln (1992) provide an explicit formulation for the higher-order version of the linear
concurrent constraint programming scheme. Scedrov (1993) gives a tutorial introduction to linear logic
itself; Saraswat (1993) supplies further background on computational aspects of linear logic relevant to the
implementation of the present proposal.
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Relationship with Categorial Syntax and Semantics As suggested above, there are
close connections between our approach and various systems of categorial syntax and seman-
tics. The Lambek calculus (Lambek, 1958), introduced as a logic of syntactic combination,
turns out to be a fragment of noncommutative multiplicative linear logic. If permutation
is added to Lambek’s system, its left- and right-implication connectives (\ and /) collapse
into a single implication connective with behavior identical to −◦ . This undirected version
of the Lambek calculus was developed by van Benthem (1988; 1991) to account for the
semantic combination possibilities of phrase meanings.
Those systems and related ones (Moortgat, 1988; Hepple, 1990; Morrill, 1990) were
developed as calculi of syntactic/semantic types, with propositional formulas representing
syntactic categories or semantic types. Given the types for the lexical items in a sentence
as assumptions, the sentence is syntactically well-formed in the Lambek calculus if the
type of the sentence can be derived from the assumptions arranged as an ordered list.
Furthermore, the Curry-Howard isomorphism between proofs and terms (Howard, 1980)
allows the extraction of a term representing the meaning of the sentence from the proof
that the sentence is well-formed (van Benthem, 1986). However, the Lambek calculus and
its variants carry with them a particular view of the syntax-semantics interface which is
not obviously compatible with the flatter f-structures of LFG. In Section 5, we will examine
more closely the differences between those approaches and ours.
On the other hand, categorial semantics in the undirected Lambek calculus and other
related commutative calculi provide an analysis of the possibilities of meaning combina-
tion independently of the syntactic realizations of those meanings, but does not offer a
mechanism for relating semantic combination possibilities to the corresponding syntactic
combination possibilities.
Our system follows categorial semantics in using the “propositional skeleton” of glue
formulas to encode the types of phrase meanings and thus their composition potential. In
addition, however, first-order quantification over semantic projections maintains the con-
nection between those types and the corresponding syntactic objects, while quantification
over semantic terms is used to build the meanings of those syntactic objects. This tripartite
organization reflects the three linked systems of representation that participate in semantic
interpretation: syntactic structure, semantic types and semantic interpretations themselves.
In this way, we can take advantage of the principled description of potential meaning com-
binations arising from categorial semantics without losing track of the constraints imposed
by syntax on the possible combinations of those meanings.
3 Quantification
Our treatment of quantification, and in particular of quantifier scope ambiguities and of
the interactions between scope and bound anaphora, follows the analysis of Pereira (1990;
1991), but offers in addition a formal account of the syntax-semantics interface, which was
treated only informally in that earlier work.
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3.1 Quantifier meanings
The basic idea for the analysis can be seen as a logical counterpart at the glue level of
the standard type assignment for generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). The
generalized quantifier meaning of a natural language determiner has the following type:
(17) (e→ t)→ (e→ t)→ t
that is, the type of functions from two properties, the quantifier’s restriction and scope,
to propositions. At the semantic glue level, we can understand that type as follows. For
any determiner, if for arbitrary x we can construct a meaning R(x) for the quantifier’s
restriction, and again for arbitrary x we can construct a meaning S(x) for the quantifier’s
scope, where R and S are suitable properties (functions from entities to propositions), then
we can construct the meaning Q(R,S) for the whole sentence containing the determiner,
where Q is the meaning of the determiner.
Assume for the moment that we have determined the following semantic structures: restr
for the restriction (a common noun phrase), restr-arg for its implicit argument, scope for the
scope of quantification, and scope-arg for the grammatical function filled by the quantified
NP. Then the foregoing analysis can be represented in linear logic by the following schematic
formula:6
(18) ∀R,S. (∀x. restr-arg❀x −◦ restr❀R(x))
⊗ (∀x. scope-arg❀x −◦ scope❀S(x))
−◦ scope❀Q(R,S)
Given the equivalence between A ⊗ B −◦ C and A −◦ (B −◦ C), the propositional part of
(18) parallels the generalized quantifier type (17).
In addition to providing a semantic type assignment for determiners, (18) uses glue
language quantification to express how the meanings of the restriction and scope of quan-
tification are determined and combined into the meaning of the quantified clause. The
subformula
∀x. restr-arg❀x −◦ restr❀R(x)
specifies that restr has meaning R(x) if for arbitrary x restr-arg has meaning x, that is, it
gives the dependency of the meaning of a common noun phrase on its implicit argument.
Property R is the representation of that dependency as a function in the meaning language.
Similarly, the subformula
∀x. scope-arg❀x −◦ scope❀S(x)
6We use lower-case letters for essentially universal variables, that is, variables that stand for new local
constants in a proof. We use capital letters for essentially existential variables, that is, Prolog-like variables
that become instantiated to particular terms in a proof. In other words, essentially existential variables stand
for specific but as yet unspecified terms, while essentially universal variables stand for arbitrary constants,
that is, constants that could be replaced by any term while still maintaining the validity of the derivation.
In the linear-logic fragment we use here, essentially existential variables arise from universal quantification
with outermost scope, while essentially universal variables arise from universal quantification whose scope
is a conjunct in the antecedent of an outermost implication.
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specifies the dependency of the meaning S(x) of a semantic structure scope on the meaning
x of one of its arguments scope-arg . If both dependencies hold, then R and S are an
appropriate restriction and scope for the determiner meaning Q.
Computationally, the nested universal quantifiers substitute unique new constants (eigen-
variables) for the quantified variable x, and the nested implications try to prove their con-
sequents with their antecedents added to the current set of assumptions. For the restriction
(the case of the scope is similar), this will in particular involve solving an equation of the
form R(x) = t, where restr❀t has been derived. The equation must be solved modulo α-,
β- and η-conversion, and any solution R must not contain occurrences of x, since R’s scope
is wider than x’s. Higher-order unification (Huet, 1975) is a procedure suitable for solving
such equations.7
3.2 Quantifier restrictions
We have seen that since the meaning of the restriction of a quantifier is a property (type
e → t), its meaning constructor has the form of an implication, just like a verb. In (18),
the first line of the determiner’s semantic constructor
(∀x. restr-arg❀x −◦ restr❀R(x))
requires a meaning x for restr-arg to produce the meaning R(x) for restr, defining the
restriction R of the quantifier. We need thus to identify the semantic projections restr-arg
and restr .
The f-structure of a quantified NP has the general form:
(19)
f :
[
spec q
pred n
]
where q is the determiner f-structure and n the noun f-structure. None of the f-structures f ,
q or n is a natural syntactic correlate of the argument or result of the quantifier restriction.
This contrasts with the treatment of verbs, whose semantic contributions and argument
dependencies are directly associated with appropriate syntactic units of the clauses they
head. Therefore, we take the semantic projection fσ of the quantified NP to be structured
with two attributes (fσ var) and (fσ restr):
(20) Det
every
f :
[
spec ‘every’
]
fσ :
[
var [ ]
restr [ ]
]
7While higher-order unification is in general undecidable, the unification problems involved here are of
one of the forms F (x) = t or p(X) = t where t is a closed term, F and X essentially existential variables
and x and p essentially universal variables. These cases fall within the lλ fragment of Miller (1990), which
is a decidable extension of first-order unification.
14
The value of var will play the role of restr-arg, supplying an entity-type variable, and the
value of restr will play the role of restr in the meaning constructor of the determiner. For
a preliminary version of the lexical entry for ‘every’, we replace the relevant portions of our
canonical determiner entry appropriately:
(21) Preliminary lexical entry for ‘every’:
every Det (↑ spec) = ‘every’
∀R,S. (∀x. (↑σ var)❀x −◦ (↑σ restr)❀R(x))
⊗ (∀x. scope-arg❀x −◦ scope❀S(x))
−◦ scope❀every(R,S)
The restriction property R should of course be derived from the semantic contribution of the
nominal part of the noun phrase. Therefore, semantic constructors for nouns must connect
appropriately to the var and restr components of the noun phrase’s semantic projection,
as we shall now see.
3.3 Noun meanings
We will use the following phrase structure rule for simple noun phrases:
(22) NP −→ Det
↑= ↓
N
↑= ↓
This rule states that the determiner Det and noun N contribute equally to the f-structure
for the NP. Lexical specifications ensure that the noun contributes the pred attribute and
its value, and the determiner contributes the spec attribute and its value.
The c-structure, f-structure, and semantic structure for ‘every voter’, together with the
functional relations between them, are:
(23)
NP
Det N
every voter
f :
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘voter’
]
fσ :
[
var [ ]
restr [ ]
]
In rule (22), the meaning constructors of the noun ‘voter’ and the determiner ‘every’ make
reference to the same semantic structure, and in particular to the same semantic projections
var and restr. The noun will supply appropriate values for the var and restr attributes
of the NP, and these will be consumed by the determiner’s meaning constructor. Thus, the
semantic constructor for a noun will have the general form
∀x. (↑σ var)❀x −◦ (↑σ restr)❀Px
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where P is the meaning of the noun.8 In particular, the lexical entry for ‘voter’ is:
(24) voter N (↑ pred) = ‘voter’
∀X. (↑σ var)❀X −◦ (↑σ restr)❀voter(X)
Given this entry and the one for ‘every’ in (21), we obtain the following instantiated semantic
constructors for (23):
every: ∀R,S. (∀x. (fσ var)❀x −◦ (fσ restr)❀R(x))
⊗ (∀x. scope-arg❀x −◦ scope❀S(x))
−◦ scope❀every(R,S)
voter: ∀X. (fσ var)❀X −◦ (fσ restr)❀voter (X)
Applying the variable substitutions X 7→ x,R 7→ voter and modus ponens to those two
premises, we obtain the semantic constructor for ‘every voter’:
(25) every-voter: ∀S. (∀x. scope-arg❀x −◦ scope❀S(x))
−◦ scope❀every(voter , S)
In keeping with the parallel noted earlier between our semantic constructors and compo-
sitional types, the propositional part of this formula corresponds to the standard type for
NP meanings, (e→ t)→ t.
3.4 Quantified NP meanings
To complete our analysis of the semantic contribution of determiners, we need to charac-
terize how a quantified NP contributes to the semantics of a sentence in which it appears,
by specifying the semantic projections scope-arg and scope in quantified NP semantic con-
structors like (25).
Individual-type contribution First, we require the meaning of the scope to depend on
the meaning of (the position filled by) the quantifier itself. Thus, scope-arg is the semantic
projection for the quantified NP itself:
8Of course, the derivation would be more complicated if the NP included adjective phrases or other
noun modifiers; for the sake of brevity, we will not discuss the contribution of noun modifiers in this paper.
Intuitively, the function of modifiers is to consume the meaning of the phrase they modify and produce a
new, modified meaning of the same semantic shape, which can play the same semantic role as the unmodified
phrase can play. Dalrymple, Lamping, and Saraswat (1993) provide a general discussion of modification in
this framework.
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(26)
NP
Det N
every voter
f :
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘voter’
]
fσ :
[
var [ ]
restr [ ]
]
every-voter: ∀S. (∀x. fσ❀x −◦ scope❀S(x)) −◦ scope❀every(voter , S)
Informally, the constructor for ‘every voter’ can be read as follows: if by giving the arbitrary
meaning x of type e to f , the f-structure for ‘every voter’, we can derive the meaning S(x) of
type t for the scope of quantification scope, then S can be the property that the quantifier
requires as its scope, yielding the meaning every(voter , S) for scope. The quantified NP
can thus be seen as providing two contributions to an interpretation: locally, a referential
import x, which must be discharged when the scope of quantification is established; and
globally, a quantificational import of type (e→ t)→ t, which is applied to the meaning of
the scope of quantification to obtain a quantified proposition.
Notice also that the assignment of a meaning to scope appears on both sides of the
implication, and that in fact the meaning is not the same in the two instances. Linear logic
allows for the consumption of the preliminary meaning in the antecedent of the implication,
producing the final meaning for scope in the conclusion.
Scope of quantification To complete our account of quantified NP interpretation, we
need to explain how to select the possible scopes of quantification, for which we used the
place-holder scope in (26).
As is well known, the scope of a quantifier is not syntactically fixed. While syntactic
effects may play a significant role in scope preferences, most claims of scope islands (eg.
May’s (1985)) are defeasible given appropriate choices of lexical items and context. There-
fore, we will take as possible quantifier scopes all semantic projections for which a meaning
of proposition type can be derived. But even this liberal notion of scope is subject to indi-
rect constraints from syntax, as those that we will see arise from interaction of coreference
relations and quantification.
Previous work on scope determination in LFG (Halvorsen and Kaplan, 1988) defined
possible scopes at the f-structure level, using inside-out functional uncertainty to nondeter-
ministically choose a scope f-structure for quantified noun phrases. That approach requires
the scope of a quantified NP to be an f-structure which contains the NP f-structure. In
contrast, our approach depends only on the logical form of semantic constructors to yield
just the appropriate scope choices. Within the constraints imposed by that logical form,
the actual scope can be freely chosen. Logically, that means that the semantic constructor
for an NP should quantify universally over scopes, as follows:
(27) every-voter: ∀H,S. (∀x. fσ❀x −◦ H❀S(x)) −◦ H❀every(voter , S)
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The foregoing argument leads to the following general semantic constructor for a deter-
miner with meaning Q:
(28) ∀H,R, S.
(∀x. (↑σ var)❀x
{
if, by assuming an arbitrary meaning x
for (↑σ var),
−◦ (↑σ restr)❀R(x))
{
a meaning R(x) for (↑σ restr) can be
derived,
(∀x. ↑σ❀x
{
and if, by assuming an arbitrary mean-
ing x for ↑,
−◦ H❀ tS(x))
{
a meaning S(x) for some scope H can
be derived,
−◦ H❀ tQ(R,S)
{
then we can derive a possible complete
meaning for H
where H ranges over semantic structures associated with meanings of type t.
Note that the var and restr components of the semantic projection for a quantified NP
in our analysis play a similar role to the / category constructor in PTQ (Montague, 1974),
that of distinguishing syntactic configurations with identical semantic types but different
contributions to the interpretation. The two PTQ syntactic categories t/e for intransitive
verb phrases and t/ e for common noun phrases correspond to the single semantic type e→ t;
similarly, the two conjuncts in the antecedent of (28) correspond to the same semantic type,
encoded with a linear implication, but to two different syntactic contexts, one relating the
predication of an NP to its implicit argument and one relating a clause to an embedded
argument.
3.5 Simple example of quantification
Before we look at quantifier scope ambiguity and interactions between scope and bound
anaphora, we demonstrate the basic operation of our proposed meaning constructor for
quantified NPs with a singly quantified, unambiguous sentence:
(29) Bill convinced every voter.
To carry out the analysis, we need a lexical entry for ‘convinced’:
(30) convinced V (↑ pred)= ‘convince’
∀X,Y. (↑ subj)
σ
❀X ⊗ (↑ obj)
σ
❀Y −◦ ↑σ❀convince(X,Y )
The f-structure for (29) is:
(31)
f :


pred ‘convince’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘voter’
]


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The premises for the derivation are appropriately instantiated meaning constructors for
‘Bill’ and ‘convinced’ together with the instantiated meaning constructor derived earlier for
the quantified NP ‘every voter’:
bill: gσ❀Bill
convinced: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀convince(X,Y )
every-voter: ∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ tS(x))
−◦ H❀ tevery(voter , S)
Giving the name bill-convinced to the formula
bill-convinced: ∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀convince(Bill , Y )
we have the derivation:
bill⊗ convinced ⊗ every-voter (Premises.)
⊢ bill-convinced ⊗ every-voter X 7→ Bill
⊢ fσ❀every(voter , λz.convince(Bill , z)) H 7→ fσ, Y 7→ x
S 7→ λz.convince(Bill , z)
No derivation of a different formula fσ❀ tP is possible. The formula bill-convinced rep-
resents the semantics of the scope of the determiner ‘every’. The derivable formula
∀Y. hσ❀eY −◦ hσ❀eY
could at first sight be considered another possible, but erroneous, scope. However, the type
subscripting of the ❀ relation used in the determiner lexical entry requires the scope to
represent a dependency of a proposition on an individual, while this formula represents the
dependency of an individual on an individual (itself). Therefore, it does not provide a valid
scope for the quantifier.
3.6 Quantifier scope ambiguities
When a sentence contains more than one quantifier, scope ambiguities are of course possible.
In our system, those ambiguities will appear as alternative successful derivations. We will
take as our example this sentence:9
(32) Every candidate appointed a manager.
We need the following additional lexical entries:
(33) a Det (↑ spec) = ‘a’
∀H,R, S. (∀x. (↑σ var)❀x −◦ (↑σ restr)❀R(x))
⊗ (∀x. ↑σ❀x −◦ H❀S(x))
−◦ H❀a(R,S)
9To allow for apparent scope ambiguities, we adopt a scoping analysis of indefinites, as proposed, for
example, by Neale (1990).
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(34) candidate N (↑ pred) = ‘candidate’
∀X. (↑σ var)❀X −◦ (↑σ restr)❀candidate(X)
(35) manager N (↑ pred) = ‘manager’
∀X. (↑σ var)❀X −◦ (↑σ restr)❀manager (X)
The f-structure for sentence (32) is:
(36)
f :


pred ‘appoint’
subj g:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘candidate’
]
obj h:
[
spec ‘a’
pred ‘manager’
]


We can derive meaning constructors for ‘every candidate’ and ‘a manager’ in the way
shown in Section 3.4. Further derivations proceed from those contributions together with
the contribution of ‘appointed’:
every-candidate: ∀G,R. (∀x. gσ❀x −◦ G❀R(x))
−◦ G❀every(candidate , R)
a-manager: ∀H,S. (∀y. hσ❀y −◦ H❀S(y))
−◦ H❀a(manager , S)
appointed: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y )
As of yet, we have not made any commitment about the scopes of the quantifiers; the
scope and scope meaning variables in every-candidate and a-manager have not been
instantiated. Scope ambiguities are manifested in two different ways in our system: through
the choice of different semantic structures G and H, corresponding to different scopes for
the quantified NPs, or through different relative orders of application for quantifiers that
scope at the same point. For this example, the second case is relevant, and we must now
make a choice to proceed. The two possible choices correspond to two equivalent rewritings
of appointed:
appointed1: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ (∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y ))
appointed2: ∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ (∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y ))
These two equivalent forms correspond to the two possible ways of “currying” a two-
argument function f : α× β → γ as one-argument functions:
λu.λv.f(u, v) : α→ (β → γ)
λv.λu.f(u, v) : β → (α→ γ)
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We select ‘a manager’ to take narrower scope by using the variable instantiations
H 7→ fσ, Y 7→ y, S 7→ λv.appoint (X, v)
and transitivity of implication to combine appointed1 with a-manager into:
appointed-a-manager: ∀X. gσ❀X
−◦ fσ❀ta(manager , λv.appoint (X, v))
We have thus the derivation
every-candidate⊗ appointed1 ⊗ a-manager
⊢ every-candidate⊗ appointed-a-manager
⊢ fσ❀t every(candidate , λu.a(manager , λv.appoint (u, v)))
of the ∀∃ reading of (32), where the last step uses the substitutions
G 7→ fσ,X 7→ x,R 7→ λu.a(manager , λv.appoint (u, v))
Alternatively, we could have chosen ‘every candidate’ to take narrow scope, by combining
appointed2 with every-candidate to produce:
every-candidate-appointed: ∀Y. hσ❀Y
−◦ fσ❀t every(candidate , λu.appoint (u, Y ))
This gives the derivation
every-candidate⊗ appointed2 ⊗ a-manager
⊢ every-candidate-appointed⊗ a-manager
⊢ fσ❀ta(manager , λv.every(candidate , λu.appoint (u, v)))
for the ∃∀ reading. These are the only two possible outcomes of the derivation of a meaning
for (32), as required.
3.7 Constraints on quantifier scoping
Sentence (37) contains two quantifiers and therefore might be expected to show a two-way
ambiguity analogous to the one described in the previous section:
(37) Every candidate appointed an admirer of his.
However, no such ambiguity is found if the pronoun ‘his’ is taken to corefer with the subject
‘every candidate’. In this case, only one reading is available, in which ‘an admirer of his’
takes narrow scope. Intuitively, this NP may not take wider scope than the quantifier ‘every
candidate’, on which its restriction depends.
As we will soon see, the lack of a wide scope ‘a’ reading follows automatically from
our formulation of the meaning constructors for quantifiers and anaphors without further
stipulation. In Pereira’s earlier work on deductive interpretation (Pereira 1990, 1991), the
same result was achieved through constraints on the relative scopes of glue-level universal
quantifiers representing the dependencies between meanings of clauses and the meanings of
their arguments. Here, although universal quantifiers are used to support the extraction
of properties representing the meanings of the restriction and scope (the variables R and
S in the semantic constructors for determiners), the blocking of the unwanted reading
follows from the propositional structure of the glue formulas, specifically the nested linear
implications. This is more satisfactory, since it does not reduce the problem of proper
quantifier scoping in the object language to the same problem in the metalanguage.
The lexical entry for ‘admirer’ is:
(38) admirer N (↑ pred) = ‘admirer’
∀X,Y. (↑σ var)❀X ⊗ (↑ oblOF)σ❀Y
−◦ (↑σ restr)❀admirer (X,Y )
Here, ‘admirer’ is a relational noun taking as its oblique argument a phrase with prepo-
sitional marker ‘of’, as indicated in the f-structure by the attribute oblOF. The meaning
constructor for a relational noun has, as expected, the same propositional form as the binary
relation type e× e→ t: one argument is the admirer, and the other is the admiree.
We assume that the semantic projection for the antecedent of the pronoun ‘his’ has been
determined by some separate mechanism and recorded as the ant attribute of the pronoun’s
semantic projection.10 The meaning constructor of the pronoun is, then, a formula that
consumes the meaning of its antecedent and then reintroduces that meaning, simultaneously
assigning it to its own semantic projection:
(39) his N (↑ pred) = ‘pro’
∀X. (↑σ ant)❀X −◦ (↑σ ant)❀X ⊗ ↑σ❀X
In other words, the semantic contribution of a pronoun copies the meaning X of its an-
tecedent as the meaning of the pronoun itself. Since the left-hand side of the linear impli-
cation “consumes” the antecedent meaning, it must be reinstated in the consequent of the
implication.
The f-structure for example (37) is:
10The determination of appropriate values for ant requires a more detailed analysis of other linguistic
constraints on anaphora resolution, which would need further projections to give information about, for
example, discourse relations and salience. Dalrymple (1993) discusses in detail LFG analyses of anaphoric
binding.
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(40)
f :


pred ‘appointed’
subj g:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘candidate’
]
obj h:


spec ‘a’
pred ‘admirer’
oblOF i:
[
pred ‘pro’
]




with (iσ ant) = gσ.
We will begin by illustrating the derivation of the meaning of ‘an admirer of his’, starting
from the following premises:
a: ∀H,R, S. (∀x. (hσ var)❀x −◦ (hσ restr)❀R(x))
⊗ (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀S(x))
−◦ H❀a(R,S)
admirer: ∀Z,X. (hσ var)❀Z ⊗ iσ❀X
−◦ (hσ restr)❀admirer (Z,X)
his: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ gσ❀X ⊗ iσ❀X
First, we rewrite admirer into the equivalent form
∀X. iσ❀X −◦ (∀Z. (hσ var)❀Z −◦ (hσ restr)❀admirer (Z,X))
We can use this formula to rewrite the second conjunct in the consequent of his, yielding
admirer-of-his:
∀X. gσ❀X −◦
gσ❀X⊗
(∀Z. (hσ var)❀Z −◦ (hσ restr)❀admirer (Z,X))
In turn, the second conjunct in the consequent of admirer-of-hismatches the first conjunct
in the antecedent of a given appropriate variable substitutions, allowing us to derive
an-admirer-of-his:
∀X. gσ❀X −◦
gσ❀X ⊗ (∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀S(x)) −◦
H❀a(λz.admirer (z,X), S))
At this point the other formulas available are:
every-candidate:
∀H,S. (∀x. gσ❀x −◦ H❀S(x))
−◦ H❀every(candidate , S)
appointed:
∀Z, Y. gσ❀Z ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (Z, Y )
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We have thus the meanings of the two quantified NPs. The antecedent implication of
every-candidate has an atomic conclusion and hence cannot be satisfied by an-admirer-of-his,
which has a conjunctive conclusion. Therefore, the only possible move is to combine
appointed and an-admirer-of-his. We do this by first putting appointed in the equiv-
alent form
∀Z. gσ❀Z −◦ (∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (Z, Y ))
After substituting X for Z, this can be used to rewrite the first conjunct in the consequent
of an-admirer-of-his to derive
∀X. gσ❀X −◦
(∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y ))⊗
(∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀S) −◦ H❀a(λz.admirer (z,X), S))
Applying the substitutions
Y 7→ x,H 7→ fσ, S 7→ λz.appoint (X, z)
and modus ponens with the two conjuncts in the consequent as premises, we obtain
∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀ta(λz.admirer (z,X), λz.appoint (X, z))
Finally, this formula can be combined with every-candidate to give the meaning of the
whole sentence:
fσ❀tevery(candidate , λw.a(λz.admirer (z, w), λz.appoint (w, z)))
In fact, this is the only derivable conclusion, showing that our analysis blocks those putative
scopings in which variables occur outside the scope of their binders.
3.8 Adequacy
We will now argue that our analysis is sound in that all variables occur in the scope of their
binders, and complete in that all possible sound readings can be generated.
More precisely, soundness requires that all occurrences of a meaning-level variable x
representing the argument positions filled by a quantified NP or anaphors bound to the
NP are within the scope of the quantifier meaning of the NP binding x. As argued by
Pereira (1990), treatments of quantification based on storage or quantifier raising either
fail to guarantee soundness or enforce it by stipulation. In contrast, deductive frameworks
based on a suitable type logic for meanings, such as those arising from categorial semantics,
achieve soundness as a by-product of the soundness of their underlying type logics.
In the present setting, meaning terms are explicitly constructed rather than read out
from well-typing proofs using the Curry-Howard connection between proofs and terms, but
the particular form of our glue-logic formulas follows that of typing rules closely and thus
guarantees soundness, as we will now explain.
Recall first that quantifiers can only be introduced into meaning terms by quantified
NPs with semantic contributions of the form
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(41) ∀H,S. (∀x. f❀x −◦ H❀S(x)) −◦ H❀Q(S)
where f is the semantic projection of the NP and Q is the meaning of the NP. Since S
outscopes x, any instance of S in a valid derivation will be a meaning term of the form
λz.T , with x not free in T . The free occurrences of z in T will be precisely the positions
quantified over by Q. We need thus to show that f and all semantic projections coreferential
f have z as its interpretation. But f itself is given interpretation x in (41), while coreferential
projections must by lexical entry (39) also have interpretation x. Since S(x) = T [z 7→ x]
with x not free in T , any free occurrence of x in S(x) must arise from substituting x for z
in T . That is, the interpretation of f and those of any other projections which corefer with
f are quantified over by Q as required.
As seen in the above argument, the dependency of anaphors on their antecedents is
encoded by the propositional structure and quantification over semantic projections of the
semantic contributions of anaphors. That encoding alone is sufficient to generate all and
only the possible derivations, but quantification over meaning terms is needed to extract
the appropriate meaning terms from the derivations. The scope of glue language variables
ranging over meaning terms guarantees that all variables in meaning terms are properly
bound.
Turning now to completeness, we need to consider the correlations between the deductive
patterns and the functional structure. With one exception, the glue-logic formulas from
which deduction starts respect the functional structure of meanings in that implications
that conclude the meaning of a phrase depend on the meanings of all immediate subphrases
which can have meanings, or depend on the phrase itself, but on nothing else. The exception
is anaphors, whose meanings depend on that of their antecedents. Thus, the meaning of
a phrase will, transitively, depend on the meanings of all its subphrases that can have
meanings and on the meanings of the antecedents of its anaphoric pronouns.
Now we can consider the possible scopings of a quantified NP in terms of phrase struc-
ture. The linearity of the implication in the antecedent of the NP’s constructor requires the
meaning of the scope to depend on the meaning of the noun phrase and that nothing else
depend on that meaning. But the above argument shows that this will be true exactly of
every containing phrase, unless there is a bound anaphor not contained in the containing
phrase that has the NP as its antecedent. So all the containing phrases that also contain
all coreferring anaphors are, indeed, candidates for scope of the quantified NP.
It is worth noting that the quantificational structure of semantic constructors is enough
on its own to ensure soundness of the resulting meaning terms. In particular, the nested
implication form of quantified NP constructors could be replaced by the flatter
∃x.gσ❀x⊗ (∀H,S. H❀S(x) −◦ H❀Q(S))
A quantifier lexical entry would then look like:
∃x. (↑σ var)❀x
⊗∀H,R. (↑σ restr)❀R(x) −◦ (↑σ❀x⊗ ∀S. (H❀S(x)) −◦ H❀Q(z,Rz, Sz))
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This formulation just asserts that there is a generic entity, x, which stands for the meaning
of the quantified phrase, and also serves as the argument of the restriction. The derivations
of the restriction and scope are then expected to consume this information. By avoiding
nested implications, this formulation may be computationally more desirable.
However, the logical structure of this formulation is not as restrictive as that of (28),
as it can allow additional derivations where information intended for the restriction can be
used by the scope. This cannot happen in our analyses, however, since all the dependencies
in semantic constructors respect syntactic dependencies expressed in the f-structure. As
long as that principle is observed, the formulation above is equivalent to (28). Despite this,
we prefer to stay closer to categorial semantics and thus capture explicitly quantifier and
anaphoric dependencies in the propositional structure. We will therefore continue with the
formulation (28).
4 Intensional Verbs
Following Montague (1974),we will give an intensional verb like seek a meaning that takes
as direct object an NP meaning intension. Montague’s method for assembling meanings by
function application forces the meanings of all expressions of a given syntactic category to be
raised to their lowest common semantic type. In particular, every transitive verb meaning,
whether intensional or not, must take a quantified NP meaning intension as direct-object
argument. In contrast, our approach allows the semantic contributions of verbs to be of as
low a type as possible. Nonetheless, the uniformity of the translation process is preserved
because any required type changes are derivable within the glue language, along lines similar
to type change in the undirected Lambek calculus (van Benthem, 1988).
We will not represent intensional types explicitly at the glue level, in contrast to catego-
rial treatments of intensionality such as Morrill’s (1990; 1993). Instead, semantic construc-
tors will correspond to the appropriate extensional types. The Montagovian intension and
extension operators ˆ and ˇwill appear only at term level, to the right of❀ in our derivation
formulas. Thus, while the meaning of seek has type e → (s → ((e → t) → t)) → t, the
corresponding semantic constructor in (43) parallels the type e→ ((e→ t)→ t)→ t.
Our implicit treatment of intensional types imposes certain constraints on the use of
functional abstraction and application in meaning terms, since β-reduction is only valid for
intensional terms if the argument is intensionally closed, that is, if the free occurrences of
the bound variable do not occur in intensional contexts (Gamut, 1991, p. 131). As we
will see, that constraint is verified by all the semantic terms in our semantic constructors.
Thus, in carrying out proofs we will be justified in solving for free variables in meaning
terms modulo the ˇˆ -elimination schema (ˇˆ P ) = P and α-, β- and η-conversion.
Generalized quantifier meanings in Montague grammar are given type (s → e → t) →
(s → e → t) → t, that is, their are relations between properties. While we maintain the
propositional form of glue-level formulas corresponding to the extensional generalized quan-
tifier meanings discussed earlier, the semantic terms in determiner semantic constructors
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must be adapted to match the new intensionalized generalized quantifier type:
∀H,R, S. (∀x. (↑σ var)❀x −◦ (↑σ restr)❀ (ˇ R)(x))
⊗ (∀x. ↑σ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ S)(x))
−◦ H❀a(R,S)
Therefore, the meaning of a sentence such as (37) will now be written:
every (ˆ candidate ,ˆλw.a (ˆ λz.admirer (z, w),ˆλz.appoint (w, z)))
The type-changing potential of the linear-logic formulation allows us to give an in-
tensional verb a single semantic constructor, and yet have the expected de re/de dicto
ambiguities follow without further stipulation. For example, we will see that for sentence
(42) Bill seeks a unicorn.
we can derive the two readings:
de dicto reading: seek(Bill ,ˆλQ.a (ˆ unicorn , Q))
de re reading: a (ˆ unicorn , λu.seek (Bill , λˆQ.(ˇ Q)(u)))
Given the foregoing analysis, the lexical entry for seek is:
(43) seek (↑ pred) = ‘seek’
∀Z, Y. (↑ subj)σ❀Z
⊗(∀s, p. (∀X. (↑ obj)σ❀X −◦ s❀ (ˇ p)(X)) −◦ s❀Y (p))
−◦ ↑σ ❀seek(Z,ˆY )
which can be paraphrased as follows:
∀Z, Y. (↑ subj)σ❀Z⊗
{
The verb seek requires a meaning Z for
its subject and
(∀s, p.
(∀X. (↑ obj)σ❀X
−◦ s❀ (ˇ p)(X))
−◦ s❀Y (p))


a meaning ˆY for its object, where Y is
an NP meaning applied to the meaning
p of an arbitrarily-chosen ‘scope’ s,
(∗)
−◦ ↑σ ❀seek(Z,ˆY )
{
to produce the clause meaning
seek(Z,ˆY ).
Rather than looking for an entity type meaning for its object, the requirement expressed
by the subformula labeled (∗) describes semantic constructors of quantified NPs. Such a
constructor takes as input the constructor for a scope, which by itself maps an arbitrary
meaning X to the meaning p(X) for an arbitrary scope s. From that input, the quantified
NP constructor will produce a final quantified meaning M for s. That meaning is required
to satisfy the equation M = Y (p), and thus ˆY is the property of properties (predicate
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intensions) that seek requires as second argument. Note that the argument p of Y in
the equation will be an intension given the new semantic constructors for determiners.
Therefore, β-conversion with the abstraction Y as functor is allowed.
The f-structure for (42) is:
(44)
f :


pred ‘seek’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
spec ‘a’
pred ‘unicorn’
]


The semantic constructors associated with this f-structure are then:
seeks: ∀Z, Y. gσ❀Z
⊗(∀s, p.(∀X. hσ❀X −◦ s❀ (ˇ p)(X)) −◦ s❀Y (ˆ p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Z,ˆY )
Bill: gσ❀Bill
a-unicorn: ∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ S)(x)) −◦ H❀a (ˆ unicorn , S)
These are the premises for the deduction of the meaning of sentence (42). From the premises
Bill and seeks and the instantiation Z 7→ Bill we can conclude by modus ponens:
Bill-seeks: ∀Y. (∀s, p. (∀X. hσ❀X −◦ s❀ (ˇ p)(X)) −◦ s❀Y (p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆY )
Different derivations starting from the premises Bill-seeks and a-unicorn will yield the
alternative readings of Bill seeks a unicorn, as we shall now see.
4.1 De Dicto Reading
The formula a-unicorn is exactly what is required by the antecedent ofBill-seeks provided
that the following substitutions are performed:
H 7→ s
S 7→ p
X 7→ x
Y 7→ λP.a (ˆ unicorn , P )
We can thus conclude the desired de dicto reading:
fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆλP.a (ˆ unicorn , P )))
To show how the premises also support a de re reading, we consider first the simpler
case of nonquantified direct objects.
28
hσ❀Al ⊢ hσ❀Al s❀ (ˇ P )(Al ) ⊢ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
hσ❀Al , hσ❀Al −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al ) ⊢ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
hσ❀Al , (∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(x)) ⊢ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
hσ❀Al ⊢ (∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
hσ❀Al ⊢ ∀P.(∀x.hσ❀x −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
Figure 1: Proof that Al can function as a quantifier
4.2 Nonquantified Objects
The meaning constructor for seek also allows for nonquantified objects as arguments, with-
out needing a special type-raising rule. Consider the f-structure for the sentence Bill seeks
Al:
(45)
f :


pred ‘seek’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
pred ‘Al’
]


The lexical entry for Al is analogous to the one for Bill . We begin with the premises
Bill-seeks and Al:
Bill-seeks: ∀Y.(∀s, p.(∀X. hσ❀X −◦ s❀ (ˇ p)(X)) −◦ s❀Y (p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆY )
Al: hσ❀Al
For the derivation to proceed, Al must supply the NP meaning constructor that Bill-seeks
requires. This is possible because Al can map a proof Π of the meaning for s from the
meaning for h into a meaning for s, simply by supplying hσ❀Al to Π. Formally, from Al
we can prove (Figure 1):
(46) ∀P. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ s❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
This corresponds to the Montagovian type-raising of a proper name meaning to an NP mean-
ing, and also to the undirected Lambek calculus derivation of the sequent e⇒ (e→ t)→ t.
Formula (46) with the substitutions
P 7→ p, Y 7→ λP.(ˇ P )(Al )
can then be used to satisfy the antecedent of Bill-seeks to yield the desired result:
fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆλP.(ˇ P )(Al ))
It is worth contrasting the foregoing derivation with treatments of the same issue in
a λ-calculus setting. The function λx.λP.(ˇ P )(x) raises a term like Al to the quantified
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I❀Z ⊢ I❀Z S❀ (ˇ P )(Z) ⊢ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
I❀Z, I❀Z −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z) ⊢ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
I❀Z, (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) ⊢ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
I❀Z ⊢ (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
I❀Z ⊢ ∀S,P. (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
⊢ I❀Z −◦ ∀S,P. (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
⊢ ∀I, Z. I❀Z −◦ ∀S,P. (∀x. I❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z)
Figure 2: General Type-Raising Theorem
NP form λP.(ˇ P )(Al ), so it is easy to modify Al to make it suitable for seek. Because
a λ-term must specify exactly how functions and arguments combine, the conversion must
be explicitly applied somewhere, either in a meaning postulate or in an alternate definition
for seek . Thus, it is impossible to write a function term that is indifferent with respect to
whether its argument is Al or λP.(ˇ P )(Al ).
In our deductive framework, on the other hand, the exact way in which different propo-
sitions can interact is not prescribed, although it is constrained by their logical structure.
Thus hσ❀Al can function as any logical consequence of itself, in particular as:
∀S,P. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Al )
This flexibility, which is also found in syntactic-semantic analyses based on the Lambek
calculus and its variants (Moortgat, 1988; Moortgat, 1992b; van Benthem, 1991), seems to
align well with some of the type flexibility in natural language.
4.3 Type Raising and Quantifying In
The derivation in Figure 1 can be generalized as shown in Figure 2 to prove the general
type-raising theorem:
(47) ∀I, Z. I❀Z −◦ (∀S,P. (∀x.I❀x −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(x)) −◦ S❀ (ˇ P )(Z))
This theorem can be used to raise meanings of e type to (e → t) → t type, or, dually, to
quantify into verb argument positions. For example, with the variable instantiations
I 7→ hσ
X 7→ x
P 7→ p
S 7→ s
Y 7→ λR.(ˇ R)(Z)
we can use transitivity of implication to combine (47) with Bill-seeks to derive:
Bill-seeks′:∀Z. hσ❀Z −◦ fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆλR.(ˇ R)(Z))
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This formula can then be combined with arguments of type e to produce a meaning for fσ.
For instance, it will take the non-type-raised hσ❀Al to yield the same result
fσ❀seek(Bill , λˆR.(ˇ R)(Al ))
as the combination of Bill-seeks with the type-raised version of Al. In fact, Bill-seeks′
corresponds to type e→ t, and can thus be used as the scope of a quantifier, which would
then quantify into the intensional direct object argument of seek. As we will presently see,
that is exactly what is needed to derive de re readings.
4.4 De Re Reading
We have just seen how theorem (47) provides a general mechanism for quantifying into
intensional argument positions. In particular, it allowed the derivation of Bill-seeks′ from
Bill-seeks. Now, given the premises
Bill-seeks′: ∀Z. hσ❀Z −◦ fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆλR.(ˇ R)(Z))
a-unicorn: ∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ S)(x)) −◦ H❀a (ˆ unicorn , S)
and the variable substitutions
Z 7→ x
H 7→ fσ
S 7→ λˆz.seek (Bill ,ˆλR.(ˇ R)(z))
we can apply modus ponens to derive the de re reading of Bill seeks a unicorn:
fσ❀a (ˆ unicorn , λˆz.seek (Bill ,ˆλR.(ˇ R)(z)))
5 Comparison with Categorial Syntactic Approaches
In recent work, multidimensional and labeled deductive systems (Moortgat, 1992b; Morrill,
1993) have been proposed as refinements of the Lambek systems that are able to represent
synchronized derivations involving multiple levels of representation: for instance, a level of
head-dependent representations and a level of syntactic functor-argument representations.
However, these systems do not seem yet able to represent the connection between a flat
syntactic representation in terms of grammatical functions, such as the f-structure of LFG,
and a function-argument semantic representation. The problem in those systems is that
they cannot express at the type level the link between particular syntactic structures (f-
structures in our case) and particular contributions to meaning. The extraction of meanings
from derivations following the Curry-Howard isomorphism that is standard in categorial
systems demands that the order of syntactic combination coincide with the order of semantic
combination so that functor-argument relations at the syntactic and semantic level are
properly aligned.
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Nevertheless, there are strong similarities between the analysis of quantification that we
present and analyses of the same phenomena discussed by Morrill (1993) and Carpenter
(1993). Following Moortgat (1992a), they add to an appropriate version of the Lambek
calculus (Lambek, 1958) the scope connective ⇑, subject to the following proof rules:
Γ, v : A,Γ′ ⇒ u : B ∆, t(λv.u) : B,∆′ ⇒ C
∆,Γ, t : A ⇑ B,Γ′,∆′ ⇒ C
[QL]
Γ⇒ u : A
Γ⇒ λv.v(u) : A ⇑ B
[QR]
In terms of the scope connective, a quantified NP is given the category N ⇑ S, which
semantically corresponds to the type (e→ t)→ t and agrees with the propositional structure
of our linear formulas for quantified NPs. A phrase of category N ⇑ S is an infix functor
that binds a variable of type e, the type of individual NPs N, within a scope of type t, the
type of sentences S. An intensional verb like ‘seek’ has, then, category (N \ (S)/(N ⇑ S),
with corresponding type ((e → t) → t) → e → t. 11 Thus the intensional verb will take as
direct object a quantified NP, as required.
A problem arises, however, with sentences such as
(48) Bill seeks a conversation with every unicorn.
This sentence has five possible interpretations:
(49) a. seek(Bill ,ˆλP.every (ˆ unicorn , λˆu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), P )))
b. seek(Bill ,ˆλP.a (ˆ λz.every (ˆ unicorn ,ˆλu.conv-with(z, u)), P ))
c. every (ˆ unicorn ,ˆλu.seek(Bill , λˆP.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), P )))
d. every (ˆ unicorn ,ˆλu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u),ˆλz.seek(Bill ,ˆλP.(ˇ P )(z))))
e. a (ˆ λz.every (ˆ unicorn ,ˆλu.conv-with(z, u)),ˆλz.seek (Bill ,ˆλP.(ˇ P )(z)))
Both our approach and the categorial analysis using the scope connective have no problem
in deriving interpretations (49b), (49c), (49d) and (49e). In those cases, the scope of ‘every
unicorn’ interpreted as an appropriate term of type e→ t. However, the situation is different
for interpretation (49a), in which both the conversations and the unicorn are de dicto, but
the conversations sought may be different for different unicorns sought. As we will show
below, this interpretation can be easily derived within our framework. However, a similar
derivation does not appear possible in terms of the categorial scoping connective.
The difficulty for the categorial account is that the category N ⇑ S represents a phrase
that plays the role of a category N phrase where it appears, but takes an S (dependent
11These category and type assignments are an oversimplification since intensional verbs like seek require
a direct object of type s → ((e → t) → t), but for the present discussion the simpler category and type are
sufficient. Morrill (1993) provides a full treatment.
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on the N) as its scope. In the derivation of (49a), however, the scope of ‘every unicorn’
is ‘a conversation with’, which is not of category S. Semantically, ‘a conversation with’ is
represented by:
(50) λP.ˆ λu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), P ) : (s→ e→ t)→ (s→ e→ t)
The undirected Lambek calculus (van Benthem, 1991) allows us to compose (50) with the
interpretation of ‘every unicorn’:
(51) λQ.every (ˆ unicorn , Q) : (s→ e→ t)→ t
to yield:
(52) λP.every (ˆ unicorn ,ˆλu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), P )) : (s→ e→ t)→ t
As we will see below, our linear logic formulation also allows that derivation step.
In contrast, as Moortgat (1992a) points out, the categorial rule [QR] is not powerful
enough to raise N ⇑ S to take as scope any functor whose result is a S. In particular, the
sequent
(53) N ⇑ S⇒ N ⇑ (N ⇑ S)
is not derivable, whereas the corresponding “semantic” sequent (up to permutation)
(54) q : (e→ t)→ t⇒
λR.λP.q(λx.R(P )(x)) : ((e→ t)→ (e→ t))→ (e→ t)→ t
is derivable in the undirected Lambek calculus. Sequent (54) will in particular raise (51) to
a function that, applied to (50), produces (52), as required.
Furthermore, the solution proposed by Morrill (1993) to make the scope calculus com-
plete is to restrict the intended interpretation of ⇑ so that (53) is not valid. Thus, contra
Carpenter (1993), Morrill’s logically more satisfying account of ⇑ is not a step towards
making reading (49a) available.
We now give the derivation of the interpretation (49a) in our framework. The f-structure
for (48) is:
(55)
f :


pred ‘seek’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:


spec ‘a’
pred ‘conversation’
oblWITH i:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘unicorn’
]




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The two formulas Bill-seeks and every-unicorn can be derived as described before:
Bill-seeks: ∀Y. (∀s, p. (∀X. hσ❀X −◦ s❀ (ˇ p)(X)) −◦ s❀Y (p))
−◦ fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆY )
every-unicorn: ∀G,S. (∀x. iσ❀x −◦ G❀ (ˇ S)(x))
−◦ G❀every (ˆ unicorn , S)
The remaining lexical premises for (55) are:
a: ∀H,R, T. ((∀x. (hσvar)❀x −◦ (hσrestr)❀ (ˇ R)(x))
⊗(∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ T )(x)))
−◦ H❀a(R,T )
conv-with: ∀Z,X. (hσvar)❀Z ⊗ iσ❀X
−◦ (hσrestr)❀conv-with(Z,X)
From these premises we immediately derive
∀X,H, T. iσ❀X ⊗ (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ T )(x))
−◦ H❀a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z,X), T )
which can be rewritten as:
(56) ∀H,T. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ T )(x)) −◦
∀X. (iσ❀X −◦ H❀a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z,X), T ))
If we apply the substitutions
X 7→ x,G 7→ H,S 7→ ˆλu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(u, v), T ),
formula (56) can be combined with every-unicorn to yield the required quantifier-type
formula:
(57) ∀H,T. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ (ˇ T )(x)) −◦
H❀every (ˆ unicorn ,ˆλu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), T ))
Using substitutions
H 7→ s
T 7→ p
Y 7→ λR.every (ˆ unicorn , λˆu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), R))
and modus ponens, we then combine (57) with Bill-seeks to obtain the desired final result:
fσ❀seek(Bill ,ˆλR.every (ˆ unicorn,ˆλu.a (ˆ λz.conv-with(z, u), R)))
Thus, we see that our more flexible connection between syntax and semantics permits the full
range of type flexibility provided categorial semantics without losing the rigorous connection
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to syntax. In contrast, current categorial accounts of the syntax-semantics interface do not
appear to offer the needed flexibility when syntactic and semantic composition are more
indirectly connected, as in the present case.
Recently, Oehrle (1993) independently proposed a multidimensional categorial system
with types indexed so as to keep track of the syntax-semantic connections that we represent
with ❀ . Using proof net techniques due to Moortgat (1992b) and Roorda (1991), he maps
categorial formulas to first-order clauses similar to our meaning constructors, except that the
formulas arising from determiners lack the embedded implication. Oehrle’s system models
quantifier scope ambiguities in a way similar to ours, but it is not clear that it can account
correctly for the interactions with anaphora, given the lack of implication embedding in the
clausal representation used.
6 Conclusion
Our approach exploits the f-structure of LFG for syntactic information needed to guide
semantic composition, and also exploits the resource-sensitive properties of linear logic to
express the semantic composition requirements of natural language. The use of linear logic
as the glue language in a deductive semantic framework allows a natural treatment of
quantification which automatically gives the right results for quantified NPs, their scopes
and bound anaphora, and allows for a clean and natural treatment of extensional verbs and
their arguments.
Indeed, the same basic facts are also accounted for in other recent treatments of com-
positionality, in particular categorial analyses with discontinuous constituency connectives
(Moortgat, 1992a). These results suggest the advantages of a generalized form of composi-
tionality in which the meaning constructors of phrases are represented by logical formulas
rather than by functional abstractions as in traditional compositionality. The fixed appli-
cation order and fixed type requirements of lambda terms are just too restrictive when it
comes to encoding the freer order of information presentation in natural language.
In this observation, our treatment is closely related to systems of syntactic and semantic
type assignment based on the Lambek calculus and its variants. However, we differ from
those categorial approaches in providing an explicit link between functional structures and
semantic derivations that does not depend on linear order and constituency in syntax to
keep track of predicate-argument relations. Thus we avoid the need to force syntax and
semantics into an uncomfortably tight categorial embrace.
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A Syntax of the Meaning and Glue Languages
The meaning language is based on Montague’s intensional higher-order logic, with the
following syntax:
(M-terms) M ::= c (Constants)
| x (Lambda-variables)
| λxM (Abstraction)
| MM (Application)
| X (Glue-language variables)
| ˆ (“cap” operator)
| ˇ (“cup” operator)
Terms are typed in the usual way; logical connectives such as every and a are represented
by constants of appropriate type. The “cap” operator is polymorphic, and of type α →
(s→ α); similarly the “cup” operator is of type (s→ α) → α).
For readability, we will often “uncurry” MN1 · · ·Nm as M(N1, . . . , Nm). Note that we
allow variables in the glue language to range over meaning terms.
The glue language refers to three kinds of terms: meaning terms, f-structures, and
semantic or σ-structures. f- and σ-structures are feature structures in correspondence
(through projections) with constituent structure. Conceptually, feature structures are just
functions which, when applied to attributes (a set of constants), return constants or other
feature structures. In the following we let A range over some pre-specified set of attributes.
(F-terms) F ::= ↑ (Indexical reference)
| f | g | h | · · · (F-structure constants)
| (FA) (Attribute selection)
(σ-terms) S ::= Fσ (Semantic projection)
| (SA) (Attribute selection)
| H (Glue-language variable)
Glue-language formulas are built up using linear connectives from atomic formulas of
the form S❀τM , whose intended interpretation is that the meaning associated with σ-
structure S is denoted by term M of type τ . We omit the type subscript τ when it can be
determined from context.
(Glue formulas) G ::= S❀τM (Basic assertion)
| G⊗G (Linear conjunction)
| G −◦ G (Linear implication)
| ΠλX.G (Quantification over M-terms)
| ΠλH.G (Quantification over σ-terms)
We usually write ΠλX.G as ∀X.G, and similarly for ΠλH.G.
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B Proof rules for intensional higher-order linear logic
Identity F ⊢ F
Γ1 ⊢ F Γ2, F ⊢ D
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ D
Cut
Exch. Left
Γ1, F,G,Γ2 ⊢ D
Γ1, G, F,Γ2 ⊢ D
λ Left
Γ, F ′ ⊢ D F →λ F
′
Γ, F ⊢ D
Γ ⊢ D D →λ D
′
Γ ⊢ D′
λ Right
⊗ Left
Γ, F,G ⊢ D
Γ, (F ⊗G) ⊢ D
Γ1 ⊢ F Γ2 ⊢ G
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ (F ⊗G)
⊗ Right
−◦ Left
Γ1 ⊢ F Γ2, G ⊢ D
Γ1,Γ2, (F −◦ G) ⊢ D
Γ, F ⊢ G
Γ ⊢ (F −◦ G)
−◦ Right
Π Left
Γ, P t ⊢ D
Γ,ΠP ⊢ D
Γ ⊢ Py
Γ ⊢ ΠP
Π Right
The Π Right rule only applies if y is not free in Γ,Σ, and any nonlogical theory axioms.
We write M →λ N to indicate that N can be obtained fromM by one or more applications
of α− or β− reduction, or by the application of the rule:
(ˇˆ (Q)) → Q
to a sub-term of M .
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